SECRET
61/S4-2-19 (CO)
Metz, Moselle, France,
14 March, 1956
Air Officer Commanding
1 Air Division Headquarters
CAPO 5052.
Exercise Bear Claw
The following comments are submitted in accordance with Annex "E" to 1 Air Div Ops Order 7/56.
Operations:
Although the exercise was only a CPX it was evident that 1 Air Div operations and the Wings were not fully informed on the control limitations existing at 61 AC&W Squadron. Consequently, all RCAF aircraft engaged in operations were to be handled through this unit. This could only be done by flying aircraft under control in squadron formations with at least two squadrons under one intercept controller on the same radio frequency. Even this would mean that six clear tactical radio frequencies would be required. These required frequencies are not available.
In addition to the actual control problem because of the limited number of radar scopes and radio frequencies, another serious problem exists in attempting to maintain current fighter status on any more than 12 sections or squadrons at any one time. This could be solved by adding in more communications, personnel and status board space, but as the limitations on control exists as outlined above there is no advantage in increasing our ability to display current status on aircraft which we could not control.
When 1 Air Div Operations insisted on us handling more aircraft than we were capable of, we resorted to Broadcast Control, which of course cannot achieve any acceptable degree of success primarily because RCAF aircraft do not have the navigational equipment to cope with the task.
As far as the deployment of the MPS-11 and one MPS-14 is concerned, your HQ is fully aware that this is not possible at this time, although it was done on "Bear Claw". Even if we had the necessary technical requirements, the shortage of personnel would prevent the operation of both sites simultaneously. More important, is the fact that the MPS-11 is only a gap-filler or back-up radar and as its range and altitude performance is so meager compared to the Type 80 it is extremely doubtful that it would be useful for anything more than protecting a very small area from attacks below 40,000 feet. This of course, would mean that the only aircraft capable of making an interception would be those scrambled on EW information not now available or else by aircraft on CAP. If we lost the Type 80 site and had only the MPS-11 to operate with, it would seem better to deploy it to an operating French or an American site and amalgamate with them, using the MPS-11 as a back-up to their main equipment.
It was obvious that an amendment to Air Division War Plan should be made to cover this dissemination of air raid warning within the Air Division. At present, this is not covered.
Logistics:
The main logistical lessons which were not learned because of the exercise but indeed were high-lighted, were that we do not have any stocks of tents, protective clothing of any type, messing, housing and decontamination facilities, small arms and anti-aircraft weapons, first-aid or casualty clearing station, fire equipment, camouflage netting, water storage and air raid shelters. Of course, even if we had the above, the personnel are not available to man or operate these essentials.
Communications:
As mentioned before, more tactical radio channels are required to provide adequate control of interception.
Few alternate methods of communications are available. Back-up lines and as a last resort, HF back-up channels and equipment are required.
It was evident that the delay in cypher traffic has not improved over past exercises. If messages are to get through in time to be of any use, some drastic action is required. A good portion of the overload can be attributed to intelligence messages which should be screened and consolidated prior to transmission to provide only that information required by each operating agency. As far as Air Division is concerned, our HQ Intelligence Staff should be given the task.
General:
Undoubtedly, many lessons were learned but unfortunately it appears that there are some recurring lessons concerning our short comings in personnel and equipment about which little or nothing seems to be done.
Although not qualified to express an over-all opinion, it does seem, that the RCAF has an effective fighter aircraft force but no adequate means of control or support for the aircraft. The end result is that, unless the enemy is as inadequate as we are, we could only fall back on our non-existent evacuation plan.
(SM Strange) W/C
CO, 61 AC&W Squadron