Metz, France

Final Report

Nine aircrew officers reported to 61 AC&W Squadron on 20 Mar 58 to be employed as Fighter Controllers during the remainder of their overseas tour. A training program was organized to train these officers to a standard comparable to the training they would have received at the USAF Controllers’ School, Tyndall, Fla. The training program was divided into one week of lectures; one week of synthetics; and three to four weeks of practical work in the ops room, depending on weather, availability of aircraft, etc.

The training syllabus from Tyndall Controllers’ School was used as a guide in preparing the lectures for this training. It was found that by virtue of their aircrew training and experience, the prospective trainee would already be very familiar with many of the subjects covered in the Tyndall précis, i.e. meteorology, aircraft characteristics, etc.

Lectures on organization, equipment and controlling procedures were prepared to cover these subjects as they affect 61 AC&W Sqn. In the even that these officers are employed as GCI controllers after their return to Canada, they would require further indoctrination in these subjects. They would also require training in Identification Procedures.

Lectures were given by F/L Fry and F/O Nixon. In view of F/L Fry’s experience as TrainO, he gave all the lectures pertaining to organization, radar theory and equipment. Subjects pertaining to Operations and controlling procedures were given by F/O Nixon. The lecture on TACC organization and function was given by W/C Ockenden.

The squadron dining room was used as a class room, and therefore had to be vacated between 1100 and 1400 hours. The last lecture each morning was used to study the duties and responsibilities of specific positions in the Ops Room. The last period before and the first period after lunch each day were spent in the operations room on familiarization, and monitoring the positions previously reviewed.

A copy of the lecture schedule is attached as Appendix "A".

Due to the number of scopes necessary to conduct synthetic practice controlling, it was planned to do this training at night during the week 31 Mar to 4 Apr. the trainee controllers were divided into two groups, one group to work evenings and one group to work nights. The first evening was quite successful, even though the 15J-1D trainer was about 60% serviceable. The remainder of the week was wasted due to 15J-1D unserviceability. Toward the end of the week it was found that the 15J-1D still held the same priority of repair as it had in the past; in other words, any other piece of equipment was unserviceable, the trainer would not be serviced.

Aircraft for control by the trainee controllers were ordered airborne by Frag Order from Air Div HQ. Three radar scopes and four VHF channels were allotted to the training program to cause as little interruption as possible to normal operations in the Ops Room.

During the first week of practical work, one CF-100 was used as a target on a tow line approximately 75 miles long. Each of the controllers working at any given time was assigned an area one third the length of the tow line, in an effort to avoid having more than one section attacking the target at the same time. The target aircraft was to be intercepted only when it was passing through that controller’s area.

All controllers had a tendency to do a curve of pursuit type of intercept, which of ten resulted in delaying the intercept until the target had entered the next area. The "Cut-off" and "Head-on with Displacement" had to be re-stressed at this point. The controllers were also inclined to disregard the large turning radius of the aircraft, placing them in such a position that the interceptors had a hard "turn-on" to complete the attack.

During the second week, control of AW aircraft commenced. The AWF aircraft were used as pairs, each aircraft alternating as target and interceptor. All controllers seemed to have less difficulty positioning the AWF aircraft for an LCC attack than they had experienced in positioning the IDF aircraft.

After about three hours of controlling AWfighters, the controllers started using speed differential. As they became more familiar with the work, they were encouraged to allow the target aircraft to set angels, air speed and heading at the pilot’s discretion.

During the last week of training, four night missions were ordered for each night. Each controller was scheduled to control at least two missions, although four of these wee eventually cancelled, leaving two controllers with only one night mission each.

The average number of attempted intercepts per controller during the training period was 99. This number does not include any controlling they were able to do under supervision of the Ops Crew on duty. Copies of the weekly reports are attached as Appendices "B", "C" and "D".

Each of these nine officers has become a proficient intercept controller. Due to the fact that eight of the nine officers are ex-AW aircrew, their average proficiency is higher in AW control than on IDF control. As might be expected, they will require more time to become completely familiar with the duties of the various positions in the Ops Room including Duty Controller.

The aircrew who were being controlled were very favourably impressed.

Each of these offices has shown, a keen interest in his new work, and by this keenness and attitude, has made the job of training much easier and very pleasant for those involved in the training program.

Synthetic practice would be of a definite value. Before attempting further training such as this, ensure that at least two technicians are fully capable of servicing 15J-1D. Also for the period of training, give the 15J-1D a priority of servicing compatible with the urgency of the requirement.

Controllers hesitated to give an initial vector to IDF aircraft to a point far enough ahead of the target to effect a "Cut-off". Unfortunately, the interceptors usually had enough speed advantage to complete a long curve of pursuit. Consideration might be given to the idea of controlling AW aircraft first. In this way, they might overcome their fear of being too far ahead of the target in the early stages of intercept.

Controllers become very dependent on IFF. It would be beneficial if they did not use IFF during their second week of controlling.

While controlling AW aircraft, if three scopes were available, and aircraft take-off times were staggered, it should be possible to practice GCI-GCA hand-offs. Even though only two pairs are being controlled, the third scope is necessary for monitoring when GCI-GCA’s are not being controlled.

Appendix "B" to
61/9.04 d/8 May 58

Apr 8 – 24 Missions – 67 Intercepts – 2.79 Intercepts per mission
Apr 9 – 9 Missions – 25 Intercepts – 2.77 Intercepts per mission
Apr 10 – 21 Missions – 57 Intercepts – 2.71 Intercepts per mission *2

*1 – F/O Urquhart was moving his furniture on Apr 8.

*2 – Part of the reason for the number of intercepts being lower, instead of higher as might be expected, was that the take-off times were not properly co-ordinated at the squadron. On at least two different occasions, the FM had to hold two sections until scopes became available from the previous mission. One of the CF-100 target aircraft was a "fuel-hog" and could stay airborne for only about one hour. Therefore, we used one of the sections of fighters as target for about 30 minutes.

Average number of IDF intercepts per controller – 16.5

(Unsuccessful intercepts include all intercepts missed for any reasons, i.e. no radio receiver, broke off for strangers, etc., as well as those caused by controller error.)