Secret
Annex 1
Outline of Problem
Mission:
The mission of 1 Air Division is to provide aircraft for air defence of the 4th ATAF area of responsibility and take the form of:
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a |
Air Interceptions over the entire 4 ATAF area. |
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b |
Fighter sweeps in direct support of special strike forces. |
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c |
Direct support package missions as requested by 4 ATAF. |
Present Operational Command and Control:
The present operational command and control channels are disjointed and incomplete. Air Div HQ is attempting to maintain tactical control of the squadrons through the COs and 61 AC&W Squadron without adequate facilities and personnel. Under existing conditions it is impossible for this HQ to control and exploit the full potential of its fighting elements because of the lack of incoming radar information on aircraft locations and hence is unable to assert its national prerogative to control its forces in war.
Prior to receiving the Type 80 radar, Air Div operations was in effect a partial TACC with no control function. Filtered radar information was fed in from both 12th AF and 1er CATAC ACCs, plotted and monitored by the operations personnel. This method of operation was both inefficient and wasteful in that the "war room" did not have tactical control of the airborne aircraft and as such little actual wartime control training could be done. The airborne information display was incomplete in that the telling CRCs told only what they had time to, or what little they could tell to a unit which could not materially add to the operational efficiency of the AC&W System. However, with the formation of 61 AC&W Squadron and when the type 80 radar became operational, all radar information was told into 61 AC&W Squadron at the radar site. With no incoming radar information the operations section at this HQ became blind. As a result, 61 AC&W Squadron had imposed on it some of the functions of a TACC but by reason of physical establishment and functional limitations, little or no authority other than over the few assigned defensive aircraft (Zulu, Interception exercises, etc) could be allotted to it. On offensive missions the GCI not only has no control authority but is physically incapable of assuming full control and without adequate information the HQ operations section has no means of control. From this there developed 4 ATAF Emergency War Plan which gave 30% of our forces to the operational control of 12th AF and 30% to 1er CATAC. Further it has become increasingly apparent that Hi Tide, as it affects the RCAF, was developed to ensure primary employment of our aircraft in a role independent of the need of control even though the efficiency of our killing, screening and escorting ability is vastly improved under controlled conditions. Properly organized, 61 AC&W Squadron facilities and controllers under wartime conditions can use up to the full fighting potential of the Air Division aircrew in controlled operations. Thus if we are to retain the integrity of our forces and realize the full fighting efficiency of our units, we must exploit the full control capability of the Type 80 radar and its associated equipment. To do this we require an organization that will be operationally responsible for implementing and controlling all aspects of high altitude fighter cover for 4 ATAF and which will be trained in its control function during peace. Such an agency would utilize some of the existing facilities of 61 AC&W Squadron and provide the necessary control and operational authority over the fighter squadrons. The establishment of such an agency is not a new concept. It has been found essential in most major air forces and is in effect in the RCAF Air Defence Command in Canada.
Required Operational Control:
Under the current system, Commanding Officers are charged with operational control of their assorted Squadrons, however, aside from allocation and co-ordination of local effort they can not effect any degree of battle control. Since our wartime posture is for eventual deployment of our fighter squadrons to a one squadron base it will become even more unrealistic to expect a Commanding Officer at a Wing to effect complete operational control over his squadrons. In order to reduce the confusion that is bound to result at the out-break of hostilities, the Air Division should parallel as closely as possible its wartime posture of Command and control. It is therefore felt that an urgent operational requirement exists for the establishment of a TACC type of operational control and command agency within 1 Air Division to exploit to the maximum the operational effectiveness of our radar and aircraft.