Metz, France

In 1954, the USAF established a Radar Approach Control unit at Chambley Air Base to control US aircraft at USAF Bases Chambley, Etain and Toul-Rosieres in France. The Chambley Approach Control Unit was in operation for about one year when it became evident that a joint control unit comprising the French Air Force (FAF), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the United States Air Force (USAF) was imperative to provide the safe movement of Air Traffic in the north-east corner of France.

What had exacerbated the control problem was #1 Fighter Wing with three Sabre Squadrons moving from North Luffenham, England to Marville, France in March 1955. Marville is located about 17 miles from Etain and as Marville is located beneath Red 10 airway, all arrival and departure procedures had to be away from the airway. The French Metz/Frescaty Air Force Base was only 10 miles from Chambley. Another interesting situation was the RCAF base at Grostenquin, France which was located beneath Red 7 Airway. But, from Grostenquin south this airway was under Paris control while from Grostenquin north to Luxembourg the airway was initially under Brussels control in Belgium. Later in 1960, Luxembourg Control Centre was opened.

The European nations jealously guarded their sovereignty and airspace so that each country preferred to have its own national ATC agency transact aircraft movements and not deal with individual foreign units. Therefore, any new joint control unit had to include the French Civil ATC called SGACC (Secrétariat Générale Aviation Contrôle de Civile).

The Air Traffic Control problem was made known to Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF) who began making plans for the joint control agency. Four ATAF, after much deliberation selected Fort Jeanne d'Arc, Metz as the site of the new radar unit. Fort Jeanne d'Arc (Of Feste Kaserin as the Germans called it) was an old underground caserne built between 1899 and 1905. It had been left to it's own devices for several years, although it served as a command post and guns were maintained in the thirties. During the Second World War, it had been a German Army Wehrmacht Command Post and Communications Centre. After WWII, the caserne languished until it was reopened for ATC use in late 1955 in the crests of the hills north-west of the city of Metz. The Germans called their kaserne "Fort Katharin" but after WWII, the French renamed it "Fort Jeanne d'Arc". During World War II, there was intense warfare in the area before the Germans were defeated leaving behind the detritus and garbage of war. The Fort was abandoned after 1945 and the first thing one noticed was the sign - "DANGER MINES". That is one sign that was obeyed as the ground was strewn with hand grenades, mines, mortars and barbed wire etc. and one picked up nothing. The area around the caserne proper had been used as a Local Training Area for the French Army as the old WW I mines had still not been cleared out. All new arrivals were cautioned to travel only on the roads and not enter the fields. Oh yes, for security, the French Air Force also maintained guard dogs which were allowed to roam free in the compound around the ATC operations room at night.

In October 1955, Four ATAF issued a general order moving the Chambley Approach Control to the new site at Metz and renamed the agency as Moselle Common Area Control Centre (MCAC) with the call sign of "Moselle Control". The unit consisted of French civilian controllers (SGACC), senior NCO's and airmen of the French Air Force and the United States Air Force. As other military forces provided airmen controllers, the RCAF provided Ground Approach Control trained Senior NCO's and other ranks. The USAF provided excellent radar and radio equipment; the German company Seimens provided the telephone intercom, 14 channel tape recorders and the German civilian technicians who provided superb service.

There were unique problems with the organisation of such an International Military Unit on French soil. The first year establishing this unique organisation can be described best in the words of the Canadian Air Force Officer appointed as first liaison, F/O Ed Thornhill:

On reporting to Air Division HQ I was directed to Wing Commander (W/C) Doug Lindsay, Staff Officer Operations and Training (SOOT) who was to be my boss and my centre of communications with Air Division. It was then explained to me that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had developed a plan for as many as twelve jet fighter bases operated by France, United States and Canada in north-east France as part of a defence network extending across Europe to protect against forces of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR) in the growing "cold war". This assembly of air bases came under the jurisdiction of Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces (4 ATAF). The air traffic control centre being organized to serve these air bases would be administered by 4 ATAF HQ located at Trier, Germany, about 100 kms north-east of Metz. Nine of these air bases were already manned and activated. The air bases lay roughly within a 100 kms radius of Metz. Their arrival/departure corridors would overlap in some cases because of their proximity to one another. This complexity was further aggravated by extension of some arrival/departure procedures extending across international boundaries of Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany. Airway Red 10, and Red 7, spanning from London over Brussels to Luxembourg and Strasbourg to Switzerland and other countries passed over several of the air bases and their traffic configurations. The airway sector between Luxembourg and Strasbourg passed between #2 RCAF Fighter Wing at Grostenquin and #3 RCAF Fighter Wing at Zweibrucken. Traffic along airways Red 10 and Red 7 would increase sharply in the near future with the introduction of wide-bodied civilian jet aircraft. Among aircraft of such capacities would be the Boeing 707 and the DC-8.

The French government, heavily preoccupied with so many peace time recovery programs, would not be able to provide the necessary air traffic control services in such a congregated complex, and had requested participating air forces to establish their own coordinating centre. In due course France would one day assume direct responsibility in its own air space. I was to be the RCAF representative officer on the international Air Traffic control committee of the participating air forces assigned to design and operate the radar air traffic control centre. The centre was to be known at the Moselle Military Common Area Control Centre (MCAC), and I was appointed as the Moselle Military Area Control Centre Liaison Office (MCAC/LO).

My familiarization with Radar Control in the European environment had been arranged for me at USAF Air Base Sembach in Germany, located north-east of the Saar Valley and about a three hour drive from Metz My route to Sembach led me north and east along the beautiful Moselle River. Being a prairie youngster I was greatly impressed by the picturesque vineyards terraced steeply upward on the north-west side of the river and its parallel roadway. My eyes boggled at the leftovers of World War I and II in evidence in every direction over every mile. We were required to learn the international pictorial road signs before receiving our drivers license, and I soon learned how helpful they can be to someone who does not know the local language. Pictorial road signs and kilometers were not to appear in Canada for another twenty years.

We soon learned to convert the eight kilometer ratio to our accustomed five miles.

After my month at Sembach I returned to Metz. W/C Doug Lindsay directed me to a French military caserne in the city of Metz. I introduced myself to Comdt Cimetiere, the French Air Force Officer appointed to be the commander of the proposed radar control unit. This position automatically made him chairman of the international committee of the three participating air forces. It was interesting to note the relatively stern discipline exercised by the French Air Force (FAF). While he was most polite to me, Commandant Cemetery was almost violent in communications with his staff. In summoning a runner he would jab a call button vigorously several times, after which I could hear someone approaching along the corridor "on the double" to the Commander's office, the door would burst open and the runner, a Warrant Officer, would dash in and come to a rigid salute: "Oui! Mon Commandant". A rapid volley of instructions would be issued by the Comdt., the runner would salute, "Oui! Mon Commandant!" He would then turn about smartly and dash out of the office. I soon learned that Cimetiere had just arrived on transfer from duty in Algeria, where military conflict had continued after cessation of World War 11.

I was invited to lunch with the Commandant and his officers in the Officers Mess, a pleasure I was to enjoy frequently until the Moselle Control site was made available about a year later. Shortly after this Cimetiere and I reported together to 4 ATAF HQs at Trier, Germany, about 100 kms north-east along the Moselle River, where we met several senior officers from the FAF and USAF. From this meeting we formed an informal committee to develop a plan for coordinated Air Traffic Control (ATC) service for the jet fighter bases. Being a top level defence program, our reference material was all highly classified, a criteria that made communication very awkward until it was declassified a few months later. For the next fifteen months or so this assignment would involve many meetings in Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg, Bonn, Trier, Ramstein and the participating air bases. Meetings in the Palace de Called in Paris, just across the Seine River from the Eiffel Tower, occurred at least monthly. Trier is a picturesque historic city. The Black Gates and surrounding area are remnants of Roman occupation. The amphitheater and underground installations for housing animal and human combatants were quite well preserved.

We were soon advised that the Radar Unit would be installed in bunkers at Fort Jeanne d’Arc, a few kilometers north-west of Metz. France would provide the operating site and a share of air traffic controllers. The United States would provide the radar unit, specialized ATC communications equipment, maintenance crews and a share of air traffic controllers. Canada would provide $125,000 for latrine services, a share of ATC controllers and bus service to transport shift personnel between Metz and Fort Jeanne d’Arc.

The MCAC committee would develop operating procedures, define the operational requirements, and arrange coordinating procedures with associated civil ATC entree, military authorities and user air bases. The MCAC Committee would keep our respective HQ's and 4 ATAF informed of our progress and coordinate approval actions. This broad-side approach to a most unique complex was to keep us very busy for the whole period of our assignment.

From the FAF were Comdt. Cimetiere, Capt. De Laminatiere, Capt. Floret, and Capt. Cabin. USAF representatives were Capt. Joanie Walker, Capt. "Mac" McCain, Capt. Ray Fortune, Capt. Al Gibbs, Lt. O'Brien, Lt. Fisk, an engineer, and Sgt. Macintosh. The RCAF provided F/O Ed Thornhill.

The French and American representatives were primarily involved in technical and administrative matters, so development of air traffic departure/arrival patterns fell to my lot. In practice we all shared in all matters from coordination to benefits complete with travel to meetings, sleepless nights and many start-up headaches. Over the months I came up with several proposed patterns, each with its inability to comply with all standard jet separation criteria. This of course was the main reason why the castaways had to be operated under one centre. Finally we obtained approval of a conceptual system, not because it met all separation requirements, but because no one could offer amendments that did not conflict in some way. It had been conceded that the final patterns would have to be resolved by actual experience. Meanwhile, those bases which were already in action were using local departure/recovery through the use of beacon GCA and fighter control radar.

Airway Red 7 from Luxembourg to Strasbourg was amended to pass over Grostenquin (#2 Wing RCAF) so as to give better centre line definition through the closely integrated patterns of #2 Wing at Grostenquin and #3 Wing RCAF at Zweibrucken.

In the late spring of 1955 the RCAF's eight GCA controllers began to arrive:

Since we did not have a operational radar site to operate there was need to find useful employment for this specialist staff if only to save them from utter boredom. One recourse – attendance at French language courses provided at Air Division HQ. Another was a "made to order" opportunity. It so happened that 61 AC&W Squadron was located near #1 Air Division HQ. This unit operated with Marconi Type 80 radar. The duties of fighter control were different than that of Approach Control or GCA, the use of radar as a medium of Identification and directional control were much the same.

W/C Gordon Ockenden, CO of 61 AC&W Squadron, was quite agreeable to indoctrinate our controllers to their task as fighter controllers, and our personnel were pleased to expand their operational experience. The reputation of 61 AC&W Squadron was very high among the RCAF fighter wings and highly respected by USAF and RAF pilots.

Several months later we were driven to what was to become our operating site. Fort Jeanne d'Arc is part of the circle of fortifications surrounding the old city of Metz. Fortifications consisted of a chain of casern (bunkers) in two, sometimes three, concentric rings separated by dry moats. The moats were reinforced by land mines and barbed wire entanglements. Barbed wire and supporting posts were much different than our Canadian pasture fences, as army combat veterans will know. Even the supporting posts have sharp jagged edges designed to tear the flesh and clothing. Our site was part of the chain of defences that connected to the famous Maginot Line. Walls and ceilings were composed of five feet or so of reinforced concrete. These fortresses had been by-passed by invading Panzer tank divisions of the German Army. Knowing that the Maginot Line would be impregnable, the German forces entered France at the eastern extremities through Luxembourg and Belgium. They had securely entrenched themselves in the fortress ring around Metz before the allied invasion began. Their position was so strong many Allied forces were obliged to blockade food supplies from the area over a period of two months. When the drive to dislodge the Germans from the casern began grenades were dropped into the ventilators. The scars of shrapnel were quite evident when we entered the shambled interiors. It must have been very discomforting to the resident soldiers. The fortress was designed to give crossfire protection against invading forces. We had been in operation for several weeks when fourteen dead German soldiers were discovered buried near the main entrance to the caserne. Despite mines and barbed wire, helmets mounted on entanglement posts disappeared within a couple of months, presumably retrieved by daring souvenir hunters of our newly formed unit. Fixed position cannons remained nearby.

The area surrounding Fort Jeanne d'Arc had been the scene of a large battle during the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. There were still common graves with names from both sides on the markers. It seems that 250,000 German soldiers on one hill side faced 250,050 French soldiers on the opposite hill side one morning. By the end of the day only 25,000 survivors remained; the others were felled by small arms fire. This unusual decapitation by small arms fire alone gives rise to a French saying to describe excessively heavy rains. "It rained as Gravelotte". Gravelotte is the name of the nearby village.

In the early summer of 1956 the two large apartment blocks built for RCAF families were made ready for occupancy. With some mixed feelings over leaving our primitive trailer site at Peltre in good summer weather, many of us there would now move into comfortable quarters.

There were not nearly enough quarters to accommodate all RCAF families, so many had to find rental space among resident citizens. In one way those families were fortunate to be closely associated with local French families, whereas we who lived in public married quarters (PMQs) were somewhat insulated from the local population. It should be stated here that a large proportion of the citizens of Metz are of German descent, a situation brought about by repeated occupations of Alsace-Lorraine

PMQ apartments were located near the southeast corner of Metz, sitting aimed beside two rings of casern separated by a very deep moat. At least one of the casernes had been used as a hospital for German soldiers. Piles of patients' records remained within. The moat and other adjacent areas still contained land mines and other munitions caches, some of which appeared to be of World War 1 vintage. Some cannon shells, when stood upright, were as tall as a man. Our children would come across a cache of munitions and alarmed parents whould scream for help. Our HQ would contact the French army and the area would be cleared by sappers then declared safe. In a matter of weeks our adventurous youngsters would happen upon another cache and another clearance would start. A story goes that F/O Bud Stirling, our Armaments Officer, was dozing in the sun by his trailer at Peltre on a warm Sunday afternoon when his young son laid something on his chest saving "Daddy, what's this?" Bud on opening his eyes saw a land mine sitting on his chest!

The Chateau de Mercy, #1 Air Division HQ was originally designed as a hospital. It was commanded by the German army during World War 11. The artistic facade and the many little rooms, tucked into the outer walls and in the attic, made it a delightful exploration site and useful for the many special interest offices that served the larger main branch offices on the two and a half stories. I had a little booth just off W/C Lindsay’s' office, where I could handle and store working papers and correspondence during the little time I was able to be there.

About half a mile from the Chateau the Germans had built an underground torpedo manufacturing plant. A huge crater, perhaps two hundred yards long and half as wide contained large blocks of blasted concrete, one about the size of a small room in a house. This was the result of bombing by two US Army P-47s.

Some of our meetings with associated authorities were of a cautious and cool nature. French civilian ATC officers were politely friendly and cooperative, but one could sense a degree of reservation because we were considered the intruders into their domain. Americans were powerful in their knowledge of the assistance they were offering to recovering programs, and so bore a presence of benign tolerance. Canadian base commanders were obviously proud of their fighter control service, but grudgingly acknowledged that our ATC formation was essential to the coordination of departure/arrival traffic in such congested patterns. The possibility of a midair collision with civilian aircraft was painfully apparent.

As a Flying Officer I was low man on the totem pole at most meetings. My paranoia was offset by the respect of all nationals for Canadian effectiveness as displayed at international air competitions. The efficiencies of Canadian aircrew and ground crews, the speed and dexterity of Canadian modified Sabre F-86's and the quality of RCAF Fighter Control commanded a high degree of prestige. It did help considerably, though, when my promotion to Flight Lieutenant came through.

At one meeting several months after drafting of procedures and technical requirements had begun, senior officers from the USAF arrived to catch up on details of site preparation and operations planning. USAF HQ had committed well over a million dollars (1955 funds) and were anxious to see the site prepared to receive installations. Early in the meeting Comdt. Cimetiere tried to make the point that all clearances for use of Fort Jeanne d'Arc were not approved and would take more time. "We must make haste slowly", he cautioned. His audience reacted in shocked silence. USAF Colonels glanced at each other, shuffled brief cases and shoulders. Fearing an exasperated walkout and termination of the whole project, F/O Thornhill, junior member of the parade, stepped boldly (foolishly) into the breech. "Gentlemen" he stammered, "I would like to call my headquarters to arrange lunch. How many of you would like to come?" I instantly became the centre of speculative examination. I'm certain that they all realized what I was up to, and they responded magnanimously. Canadian Armed Forces feed their overseas troops very well, and most foreigners are delighted to attend our dinner table. All 20 of the FAF and USAF officers raised their hands and I scrambled to the nearest telephone. Through Doug Lindsay's help and an understanding Officers Mess President, I was able to lead half a dozen car loads of hungry diners to a special setting hosted by Lindsay, the French Liaison Officer and a few other senior officers. After a very congenial lunch we all returned to Fort Jeanne d'Arc with renewed interest. Air Division had come through for me in time of need and the meeting resumed in a spirit of goodwill.

On another occasion we had meeting commitments at Brussels, Trier and Ramstein. Knowing that it would take over a week to meet such a route by road I phoned W/C Lindsay for use of an aircraft to carry the party. At departure time an RCAF Dakota arrived at Metz-Frescaty Airport to pick us up. A USAF Colonel demanded to know who had called up this aircraft, "F/O Thornhill" replied one of my American associates. I swear I stood two inches taller!

After 18 months of suspense our CPN-18 radar and newly manufactured communications consoles were in place. There were many problems, however, in coordinating the technicalities of American equipment with European electric power sources. A number of transformers and converters were required. For example, equipment designed for 60 cycles per second power supply had to be married to French 25 cycle circuits. After a month of frustration the unit could not meet a flight check operation. Having discussed this situation with F/L Basil Wood of 61 AC&W Squadron, I asked my USAF friends if it would be acceptable to have an RCAF engineer take a look at the problem. "Ed" said Captain Al Tibbs, "if you can bring in any help at all we would be most appreciative". Next morning an RCAF Sergeant and an LAC appeared and I introduced them to the USAF technical officer. The two RCAF technicians worked all day, but the next day the Sgt. was not able to be present, so the LAC worked on alone. At the end of the second day the equipment was declared in working order and the LAC addressed the USAF crew, explaining what problems had been resolved and what future care would be needed. A flight check was then called up from USAF resources and the flight check was successfully completed. Months afterward I was to hear an American controller threaten his technician; "Remember what that Canadian said! If you goof this up I'll have you up on charges!"

Twenty-three letters of agreement were required before we could commence control operations. These included civil ATC centres in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, military HQ’s for related 4 ATAF participants, and all the base commanders to be served. We even had a letter of agreement to serve communications flights between #3 Wing at Zweibrucken and #4 Wing at Baden-Soellingen. 4 Wing had not been recommended for inclusion in Moselle Control by 4 ATAF. To the best of my recollection the following bases were included in the Moselle Control Area:

Three other bases included in the initial concept were not activated during my tenure. General policy on commencement of control operations was to expand to one base at a time as experience proved the capacity to do so.

Quite early in our operation we received a flight plan from a formation of F-104's en route from USA to Phalsbourg, France. The formation had refuelled in flight and was to take part in an open house event during the weekend. The formation was transferred to Moselle Control near Paris. Our radar placed the F-104's on final approach to Phalsbourg. One of the pilot's reported uncontrollable shuddering, pulled straight up and bailed out, the aircraft disintegrating about him! I met him at the open house that weekend, carrying a cane, limping and .wearing a couple of band aids on his face. Moselle had experienced its first emergency.

My crises in Moselle Control did not always have a rewarding conclusion. On a Friday morning just before Labour Day weekend we received a telegram from a USAF bombing wing which had arrived at a base just inside Germany east of RCAF #2 Wing's base at Grostenquin. The telegram announced that the bomber departure route was in a westbound direction and that all flights were warned to remain clear of that area from now on. A quick check of the map revealed that such departure would penetrate #2 Wing's already established departure corridor. No other departure route was available to #2 Wing. This was our first jurisdictional challenge and we were not sure how we should handle it. Our FAF Commander, now Lt. Col. De la Salle, was not available. Being the beginning of a long weekend I had to advise my new boss, W/C Knowles, of our dilemma. He was far from sympathetic instructing me to take whatever course may be available to protect #2 Wing's operation. At this time the cold war had warmed up to a high degree of intensity, and the prospect of shutting down the launch of seventy-five Sabre F-86s was not acceptable. Reeling from the seriousness of the situation I hastened back to Moselle Control. Our committee considered appealing to 4 ATAF at Trier, but we had had no operational involvement with that Headquarters and were therefore not confident of that option. We were thus compelled to do what we should have done on receipt of the telegram: that is to send out a NOTAM advising of #2 Wing's authorized departure lane and forbidding all entry into that zone by other aircraft. I was most appreciative of my USAF associates on the committee because I realized the pressure that was implied against them by their own HQ. By this time our working day was well over, so we non-shift workers went home to begin our Labour Day weekend.

By the time I arrived at my Married Quarter, an RCAF police sergeant was waiting for me in his vehicle. He informed me that USAF HQ at Ramstein wished me to phone them immediately, regardless of the hour. It seemed that they had been advised of our NOTAM reference #2 Wing Departure area. I called the appropriate number and was informed that they wanted me to appear as soon as possible to discuss the NOTAM. Ramstein is a good two hour drive from Metz. The USAF officer on the line, Captain Ted Foreman, had been one of my staunchest allies and friends. He was now in a bind with his superiors, as I was with mine!

"Would you come over immediately?" he wanted to know. I replied that I had no option operationally or administratively. Therefore there was nothing to be gained by such a meeting. Despite further appeals during the weekend I held my ground. There seemed to be no point in spending a long weekend in someone else’s Lion's den!

On Tuesday morning Lt. Col. de la Salle and I flew over to Ramstein where we were introduced immediately to General Davis USAFE Chief of Operations. We explained our tactical position and reviewed our responsibility and authority to him. I was very impressed with the impartiality of his deliberations. It became apparent to all of us in the General's office that a staff decision to locate the Bomber Wing in its new location had been a grievous error. Feeling very fortunate to be thus vindicated I accompanied Lt. Col. de la Salle home in his aircraft.

At the end of June, 1958, I was transferred to RCAF Station St. Hubert. My extraordinary role as an innovator in international Air Traffic Control environment was over!

Moselle Control was responsible for Air Traffic coverage in the north-east corner of France, a portion of Luxembourg, and some of the area of West Germany. This was a most interesting tour with elbow co-ordination and some of our Air Bases having to co-ordinate their GCA patterns so the aircraft coming in for landing would not conflict.

Some support was also given to the USAF base of Chaumont, and the French Base at Strasbourg. En route control for all NATO aircraft was also a task of this centre. Finally, the RCAF bases often used Moselle for transiting from their home bases to the French Firing range at Suippes, which lay on the edge of Moselle Control Area. The Quadripartite group that established this Centre allotted tasks as follows:

To carry out their mandate, the SGACC (French Civil Control) established a low-level mini-airway system over the Moselle Control area with conventional aircraft flying directly over each jet base above the jet arrival and departure corridors. Menthol Air Defence Radar(FAF) provided Military ATC Radar Control above Flight Level 250.

The French Air Force often conducted large scale para drops just west of Fort Jeanne d'Arc between Frescaty and Chambley. The sky would be filled with several large parachutes connected to jeeps and other vehicles of war. There was a constant flow of low-level aircraft between all air bases as well as helicopters and army aircraft involved in the various war games.

Some of the RCAF GCA Controllers in the early 1960's were:

This was a fine group of dedicated controllers whose professionalism was a source of pride to all Canadians. The RCAF NCO controllers provided the stability and experience so necessary for the continuity of safe air traffic control. As these men had the seniority, experience and expertise, they were usually utilized as Shift Supervisors and they maintained an excellent rapport with the USAF and FAF controllers. The USAF had their officers strength as the Chief Controller and whenever the USAF became too erratic or zealous, the RCAF Chief Controller would suggest it might be a good idea to change the system with the Canadians controlling RCAF aircraft and the USAF looking after their own, similar to the SGACC and the FAF. Things usually calmed down pretty quickly.

An interesting competition developed between the Canadian airmen and the American airmen to try and beat the appearance of F/S Keith Cameron. Keith would arrive for work with his pink scalp shining through his short, short brushcut, precisely pressed uniform and the shiniest shoes imaginable. The Americans tried but finally resorted to buying patent leather shoes in a vain attempt to match Keith's shoes.

Over the years there were many military changes to the operational direction of #1 Air Division. TACAN was provided by the RCAF early in the 1960's and Moselle Control with the help and guidance of the Command Instrument Check Pilot, Flight Lieutenant Gord Morrison, drew up all the TACAN procedures for the Canadian Fighter Wings in advance of the TACANs being commissioned.

In 1956 and 1957, a shortage of all-weather interceptor aircraft in NATO caused the Canadian Government to replace one Sabre day-fighter squadron in each of the four Canadian Fighter Wings with a CF-100 all-weather fighter squadron. The CF-100's required considerable retraining for European operations and sometimes the pilots at Marville caused Moselle Control some consternation. One CF-100 pilot requested a GCA letdown at Chambley and everything proceeded normally until the Chambley GCA controller called that the CF-100 had disappeared off his scope. During the subsequent telephone search and alert of Search and Rescue, another CF-100 did a GCA letdown at Chambley and again disappeared off the Precision Scope. Now the Chambley GCA operator was devastated and convinced he had misaligned his equipment and had crashed two aircraft. A quick call from Marville tower revealed that the CF-100's had carried out a GCA Approach at Chambley until the pilots were able to see the ground and then without telling anyone, broke off and sneaked into Marville at tree top height.

In order to move aircraft through the upper airway over Marville, Moselle Control would ask for a reservation at Flight Level 250 and Flight Level 210. Normally this procedure worked well - the Marville jets crossed the Non-Directional Beacon/TACAN at assigned altitude; and when clear of the airway they would commence their letdown. Until one day!

Investigation revealed that the plane was an Air India Comet under Paris Control. Moselle Control immediately contacted Paris Control and reported the near miss. The only response was: "It is French airspace!" Moselle asked, "Do you want to give us another airspace reservation?" Once again the reply, "It is French airspace!" The problem was handed over to the SGACC Liaison Officer Acting Commandant François Barr for resolution - it never was fully cleared up. Paris would use the two altitudes any time they so wished, but at least after that incident, they would pass traffic to Moselle Control when using Flight Level 250 or Flight Level 210. Moselle Control has to provide separation!

One day the French civilian SGACC controller threw his headset on the console, muttered "Too busy! Too busy!" and walked out of the control room. The shift supervisor asked LAC Roger Guilbert to take charge of that position. After a veritable flurry of French and English instructions, French co-ordination with Paris Control and a great deal of co-ordination with the USAF, FAF and RCAF sectors, Roger Guilbert had the situation under control and finally coaxed the French SGACC controller to resume his duties. It was an outstanding example of emergency air traffic control and exemplified the manner in which Roger Guilbert always conducted his work!

Moselle Control was the main arrival and departure base for all Canadian personnel between Canada and #1 Air Division. About 1962, departure delays were becoming excessive as Paris Control was having difficulty climbing the Yukon Transport aircraft along the airway - Moselle Control suggested a "Yukon Departure" where the Yukon aircraft would receive an ATC clearance to join Paris controlled airspace at a specified point and at an assigned altitude. Moselle Control would climb the aircraft south-west of Marville, transit the Suippes Gunnery range with clearance from the FAF and dog-leg the aircraft to the north-west to join the airway at an assigned level. The procedure worked well.

In 1964, after #2 Fighter Wing at Grostenquin was closed, officer controllers were transferred to Moselle and Approach Control was established for Marville at MCAC. Some of the officers were:

The writer was transferred to MCAC in 1965 - I walked into the operations room and saw a sign "DANGER! IN CASE OF SNAKEBITE SEE THE SERGEANT OF THE DAY!" Now as a young boy, I had been tormented by my older brothers with garter snakes to the point of hysteria and, to this day, I do not like snakes. On my query as to, "Why the sign?," I was informed somewhat airily, "Oh, we have vipers living in the communication trenches." One ATC Officer was almost out the door, en route for Canada, when this statement was expanded to include, "... but they have been driven well clear of the Base area!" Wow! What a relief!

The Commander of Moselle in 1966 was a French Air Force Commandant (Major) Commandant Bagard who had been horribly burned in an aircraft crash. This had not detracted from his personality and he was a most charming man to work for. However, in common with French Air Force Officers, he did not fully understand the task of an Air Traffic Control Officer. One day, we had a TAC EVAL operating at Marville and had opened all our control bays and even the Chief Controller, F/L Hanover, was required to work in an active control position. The Commander came downstairs to the Control Room and said, "The Colonel from Metz-Frescaty is here for lunch and I want all officers to come upstairs to be at the reception for the Colonel. F/L Hanover pointed out that the TAC EVAL at Marville was our first concern. The Commander countered by saying that the RCAF had one NCO and he could control the radar. F/L Hanover again stated, "I'm sorry, sir, the positions must be manned by officers!" This provoked Commandant Bagard pulling himself up to his full five-foot two inch height and saying rather pompously, "Humph, in the French Air Force, officers do not work!" (I privately agreed with him and felt the RCAF should adopt such a system.) Finally, one of our officers went to dinner with the Colonel while the rest of us carried on. Military life in one country is not drastically different from another.

Alas, this was in the time that General Charles De Gaulle had decided that all NATO forces should leave France by 1 April 1967 or fall under command of French Commanders. That summer of 1966, there was a latter rebirth of the famous World War II "RED BALL EXPRESS." US Military trucks moved ceaselessly from French depots carrying US NATO-assigned supplies into new logistic areas in Karlsruhe, Mannheim and Kaiserslautern. This was a most expensive and labour-intensive task! While this was going on, Canada was planning the move of her Marville Squadrons to Lahr, West Germany. Unfortunately, the French Air Force did not move from Lahr until much later in 1967, while the RCAF CF-104 Squadrons had to move from Marville by 31 March 1967.

Moselle Common Area Control Centre had closed down on 31 December 1966 and the Marville RATCON had to be reopened in January 1967 until the squadrons moved. This necessitated the Metz/Moselle control staff to travel daily from Metz to Marville, a distance of some 72 miles to provide control for the CF-104 flights still providing missions for 4th Allied Tactical Air Force. The French Civilian SGACC staff closed Moselle Control at midnight on 31 December 1966 with some unusual French panache! They broke a bottle of French wine over the main electrical switch! And so ended a unique experience in multi-national air traffic control – all Canadian Air Traffic Controllers can be proud of the part they played in all areas of Moselle Common Area Control Centre.