Canada's Bomarc Missiles

Nuclear Warheads in Canada

Initial Warhead Delivery

Once it had been announced that the 16 August 1963 agreement had been signed, people naturally thought that warheads would be soon forthcoming. The MND was asked in late November if there were any nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, and he replied "Not that I am aware of." The vaguely amused Member went on to ask whether the MND would be aware of it if they were indeed stored on Canadian soil. Hellyer replied "I would hope so". However, there is evidence to suggest that as early as 1950 the USAF was storing nuclear weapons in Canada without the MND being appraised of such.

Two weeks later the Prime Minister was asked if there were US nuclear weapons at La Macaza, North Bay, or any other bases in Canada. The fact that it is possible for there to have been SAC weapons at Goose Bay without the express knowledge of the PM is probably what lead Pearson not to answer, even though there were no such weapons at the five RCAF ADC stations. Again the Member pressed the PM for an answer, but Pearson replied that he had still not be advised "to that effect". Perhaps the most interesting statement given by the Government concerning delivery was made by the Associate Minister of National Defence. He said that the delivery of nuclear weapons is subject to the authorization of the US President personally, and that "President Kennedy's untimely death has caused some delay." Perhaps if it had not been for the assassination of Kennedy, the first Bomarc warheads would have arrived a month earlier.

On 30 December 1963, US President Lyndon B Johnson signed a one page top secret memo for US Secretary of Defense Robert S McNamara. This memo, still unavailable, authorized the shipment of US nuclear weapons to Canada for the arming of Canadian military systems. Just over 24 hours later, the first warheads were in Canada.

The first warheads for the Bomarc arrived not in secret, as is usual for nuclear weapons shipments, but to a great fanfare of press coverage. Reporters from the North Bay Nugget were present as the convoy of warhead carriers moved down the highway from the airfield to the Bomarc launcher site north of town. Newspapers across the country carried the story, along with photographs, of the warheads arriving in Canada on New Years' Eve, 1963.

At approximately 10:00 pm, 31 December 1963, with only two hours left in the year, a USAF Military Air Transport Command C-124C Globemaster transport aircraft, serial number 0-20975, of the 19 LSS, touched down at RCAF Station North Bay. The seven warheads were removed from the aircraft, and "convoyed to the Bomarc Site immediately on off-loading." Three trucks marked "Explosives" went from the airfield to the Bomarc site, and one stopped at the ordnance building for unloading. The remaining two trucks moved to the shelter area to deliver the warheads directly to the launchers. The next day MND Paul Hellyer would announce that the warheads delivered that night had been installed on the Bomarcs upon arrival.

Although the warheads had been expected, it is clear now that the Canadian Government and military were caught slightly off guard by their arrival. A week after the initial shipment, not only was Paul Martin talking to Pearson about the "unexpected arrival of warheads", but even the military was referring to the "recent sudden arrival of warheads".

The other problem evident from the initial delivery was that the customs service intended to inspect each imported shipment, and insisted on normal customs procedures, such as clearly marked crates, and perhaps even import duties. In the end this was waived, but customs was still present at each delivery. The Trade and Commerce Department eventually got their way, and External Affairs applied for permits for the import and export of US nuclear weapons on behalf of the United States.

The second of what came to be four initial shipments arrived at the airfield on 5 January 1964, and from the RCAF Station, a three-truck convoy proceeded north on #11 highway.

The third shipment of warheads provoked the greatest concern. Like the first two deliveries, the USAF Globemaster arrived under cover of darkness on 8 January at 3:00 AM, and immediately off-loaded seven or eight W40 warheads. The problem then began when a freak geological occurrence caused an earthquake in the North Bay area only two hours later. Residents feared that a Bomarc warhead had exploded, and that the shaking of the ground was a sign of the nuclear detonation. Many calls to the police and to Station North Bay revealed to residents that the apocalypse was not beginning.

With the arrival of the fourth shipment of warheads three days later on 11 January 1963, 446 SAM Squadron was fully and completely armed.

Despite the required change in thinking CFS La Macaza was not without its nuclear weapons accidents. Various "Dull Swords" or minor accidents involving live war reserve nuclear weapons were reported over the years. The first occurred just days after the fourth warhead delivery, when in the early morning of 18 January 1964 a Leading Aircraftman fell asleep while driving in front of Bomarc launcher/shelter #3 and thereby allowed his vehicle to hit the USAF Detachment Mobile Inspection Unit (MIU) van. As there was a warhead in the shelter, and as the MIU van was in use monitoring the Bomarc system, this was considered a significant occurrence. Another problem, this one not caused by lack of sleep but by system failure, was much more significant. A Dull Sword was declared and reported when it was discovered that the Bomarc launch control circuits were inadvertently switching control centres without action being taken by the human controllers. Because this was a potentially disastrous event, it generated a great deal of paperwork and bilateral discussion.

Even more serious than a relatively simple Dull Sword was a Broken Arrow. The US military defines Broken Arrows as accidents or incidents which have the possibility of producing an unauthorized nuclear detonation, or which involves the theft of a war reserve weapon, or the dispersal of nuclear material, or a fire in or around the war reserve weapon. One of these happened during the summer of 1967 when, during routine maintenance, RCAF personnel discovered a potential fire in the warhead section of the Bomarc in #28 launcher-shelter. With the fire fighters, security, and US custodians in attendance, the maintenance personnel opened the nosecone and found that several electronic components had been burned. The warhead was removed, the electronics replaced, and the missile re-armed. No cause was determined.

10 July 1967, 2135Z, Secret, Immediate, to CANFORCEHED from 447 SAM Sqn.

During an MIU minor run, MIU van personnel noticed smoke coming from the electronics bay of the nose cone of missile number 1030 in shelter number 28. Alarm turned in to fire hall. A potential Broken Arrow was declared at 1945Z and the Station NAR plan implemented. Power shut off on shelters 22, 24, 26, 28. Initial control point set up opposite shelter 18. On investigation by fire fighters no smoke was seen however upon opening of nose cone smoke and fumes observed, no fire detection. Maintenance personnel investigated, found electronics parts had burned. Down load then proceeded with on shelter 28 potential Broken Arrow downgraded to maintenance problem at 2030Z.

Throughout the summer of 1964 protesters staged demonstrations and sit-ins at the main and side gates of the La Macaza Bomarc site. On 24 June 1964, approximately 90 peace marchers sat down and blocked the main gate. On 6 August 1964, a peace demonstration and vigil at the main gate, called "Operation Hiroshima Day", was carried out by ban-the-bomb groups from across the country and from the USA. Later, "Operation Labour Day" was a week long ban-the-bomb demo held during the first week of September.

But nuclear weapons were important to the Government, and both the civilian and military authorities feared and distrusted those who disagreed with their nuclear policies and the nuclear deployments. The RCMP were therefore called out to provide both security at the various nuclear bases, and to spy on the people and groups involved in peaceful and constitutionally-guaranteed protest: a right which Canadian soldiers had gone to war to protect three times in the previous fifty years. Freedom is indivisible, but this concept was lost on the government and its security forces.

While the RCMP were rarely involved in simple base security, they were the office of primary interest when it came to monitoring citizens' constitutionally-guaranteed legal dissent. The files of the RCMP security branch were transferred to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) when the new agency took over from the RCMP in the early 1980s, and after a few years, these old files were transferred to the National Archives, but kept under the control of CSIS. There are massive RCMP files on protests, protesters, and anti-nuclear organizing across the country held by the National Archives.

The released files deal with the activities of the RCMP at La Macaza and in other Canadian locations, and are representative of the state of RCMP interest at all nuclear sites such as North Bay, Comox, Chatham, and Bagotville. The standard practice was to take as many photographs as possible and then try to identify the persons protesting. One officer even set up what he referred to as a "discreet observation post" near the Supreme Court in order to take down license plate numbers and possibly photograph people gathering to drive to La Macaza for a demonstration. The RCMP was also involved in collecting anti-nuclear literature from both open and covert sources, and this information made its way into the files. Some documents belonging to a person or group opposed to the North Bay Bomarc nuclear weapons were copied by the RCMP North Bay Commander, Inspector HF Law, using a "Robot camera... Kodak Tri X Film, time 1/25 second, distance 2'2" and setting F.16". Whether Inspector Law was in the offices of the anti-nuclear group legally is questionable.

Files show that the RCMP gathered information on the "unwashed, uncut and uncouth" peace demonstrators, and disseminated it to various RCMP detachments across the country. If a car was observed at a demonstration, the license plate number was recorded, searched, and the information forwarded to the RCMP detachment nearest the owners home. The purpose of forwarding the information was so that the local detachment could ensure "that a close watch will be maintained for any indication of such an occurrence", i.e., the development of anti-nuclear organizers, activists, and organizations. Although there was no indication that people were doing anything that under even the broadest interpretation of Canadian laws could be considered less-than-legal, the government had those who disagreed with the nuclear policy closely monitored by the national internal security forces.

The paranoia was extensive, and resulted in many and varied breaches of personal privacy and security. For instance, "F" Division RCMP officers in Saskatoon, in following-up a La Macaza protest report, gained access to the central records office of the University of Saskatchewan at Saskatoon. They then built up their own file on a man whose name is erased from the reports, but who was identified as being active in the student Christian movement from 1959 to 1964. The RCMP officer had infiltrated the campus, and knew the person by sight, having attended some of the same meetings. This religious studies student in Saskatchewan was considered a threat to the security of the Liberal Governments' continued deployment of nuclear weapons.

The depth of the paranoia is clear from the manner in which they treated even common information. A message from the RCMP officer at La Macaza to "A" division Ottawa dealing with an ongoing demonstration was classified as Secret and sent through a secure line after being enciphered.