St. Margarets, NB

2 ADCC Operation Order 2/54
"Exercise Check Point"

References:

National Topographical Series of No. 2 Sector area.
ASI’s 2/6,2/21,2/24,3/2 (temporary), 5/3
Intelligence Standard Operating Procedures
ADC TI Arm 05 – 1 / 4
Command Pilots Orders, Sec VI, Order No. 2
Org Directive 3/54
App "A" to ADC letter S601-1(SOComm), 10 Jun 54
App "A" to ADC letter S601-7(Comm 1), 17 Jun 54

Greenwich Mean Time (Z) will be used throughout this order.

The following is the task organization in No. 2 Air Defence Sector. (See Annex "1" attached or Organization Chart).

Expansion of and additions to the following information are contained in Annex 2.

a - FAKER Forces - Simulated enemy aircraft termed "FAKER" will be provided by RCAF tactical Air Command, Maritime Air Command, Training Command, 3 OUT (Mitchell and T-33 aircraft), USAF Strategic Air Command, and EADF Air Defence Command (Tentative). These aircraft will be making simulated attacks on Canadian targets some of which may be located within No. 2 Sector. FAKER aircraft can also be expected to penetrate 2 Sector enroute to, or returning from targets in other Sectors or in the United States.

b - Friendly Forces - The following forces will be available within No. 2 Sector: - 2 squadrons of interceptor aircraft provided by RCAF Station Chatham (No 1(F) OUT and 431 Squadron). GCI facilities provided by 21 AC&W Squadron. EW facilities provided by 22 AC&W Squadron, 211 AW Squadron and 221 AW Squadron. GObC facilities provided by 61 GObC Det., 70 GObC Det., and 71 GObC Det.

Note - In addition to providing EW facilities 22 AC&W Sqn., 211 AW and 221 AW Squadrons will be capable of accepting handovers and conducting a limited number of intercepts.

c - Attachments and Detachments - AC&W Squadron (Auxiliary) 2450 deployed at St. Margarets, NB and AC&W Squadron (Auxiliary) 2405 deployed at Halifax, NS.

The intention is to exercise, in the defensive role, the assigned Air Defence forces of Number 2 Sector in conjunction with those of other Sector and Air Divisions (Defence).

a - General - The exercise will be held on the 9, 10 and 11 of July. Specific hours for commencement and termination being 090900Z until 112300Z. The nickname for the exercise will be "Check Point".

b - Control -

1 - The over all control of the exercise is vested in the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command, through the Combat Operations Centre.

2 - The Sector Commander, 2 Sector, is to exercise operational control over all fighter aircraft, AC&W Squadrons, AW Squadrons and GObC Detachments shown in the 2 Sector Operational Organization in Annex "1".

c - Cancellation or Postponement -

1 - Weather - The decision to cancel or postpone all, or any portion of the exercise will rest with the AOC, ADC. Unless definite instructions to the contrary are received it is to be assumed that the exercise will take place as scheduled.

2 - Actual Emergency - In the event of an actual emergency occurring during the exercise, a pre-selected code word will be transmitted to participating units to indicate cancellation. All units will be informed of the selected code word approximately 24 hours before the exercise.

d - Special Operational Instructions - These instructions, applicable to all No. 2 Sector defensive forces participating in "Check Point" are contained in Annex 3 to this order. Except as detailed in Annex 3 normal instructions, orders and procedures are to apply.

Interceptor Aircraft -

1 - 1 (F) OTU - 1 (F) OTU is to provide one squadron of Sabre aircraft during daylight hours (1 hour before sunrise until 1 hour after sunset) on 9, 10 and 11^th. Specific readiness states are to be ordered by 21 AC&W Squadron as required.

2 - 431 Squadron - 431 Squadron is to provide all possible Sabre aircraft during the period from 1 hour before sunrise until 1 hour after sunset on 9, 10, and 11 July. Specific readiness states are to be ordered by 21 AC&W Squadron as required.

3 - Night Intercepts - Sabre aircraft will be placed on a state of readiness or higher during daylight hours only. Night interceptions are not to be attempted with this type aircraft.

4- Rules of Engagement - See special operational instructions. (Annex 3 attached hereto).

f - Control of Interceptor Aircraft - All aircraft of 431 (F) Squadron and the assigned aircraft from No 1 (F) OTU are to be initially under the control of 21 AC&W Squadron subject to the following conditions:

1 - The GCI prerogative of scrambling is to be limited to four fighters from each unit. The remaining aircraft are to be brought to the various states of readiness by 21 AC&W Squadron as necessary but are to remain under the control of 2 ADCC and will be released for scramble at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

2 - Scramble action where interception will take place beyond GCI range of 21 AC&W Squadron is to be initiated at Sector level.

g - Operational States - Radar Units - All radar units will be placed on the highest operational state possible consistent with personnel and equipment limitations. Preventative maintenance periods will be adjusted to provide maximum capability during periods of increased air activity in the Sector.

h - Ground Observer Corps - 61, 70 and 71 GObC Det and subordinate observation posts are to be fully operational for the duration of the exercise.

i - Intelligence - Refer to "Special Intelligence Instructions", Annex 2 attached.

a - Narrative Reports - Narrative reports outlining unit action during the exercise, together with comments, criticism and recommendations are to be prepared and submitted, in duplicate, by the units of the task organization to 2 ADCC prior to 20 July.

b - Debriefing Questionnaires - See "Special Operating Instructions" Annex 3 attached.

a - Message Prefix - All operational and administrative messages concerning the exercise, including those before and after the exercise period, are to be prefixed "Exercise Check Point".

b - Signal - Normal communications facilities will be used together with those facilities called up and installed for the duration of the exercise.

1 - Additional facilities are as follows:

A - Longline circuits - As per Appendix "A" to ADC letter S601-1(SOComm) dated 10 Jun 54.

B - Val d’Or -

i - Tower VHF - A/G/A transmit and receive on:

ii - Distress

iii - Tower

iv - Homer

C - 141.66 ADC/GCI Common and Scramble. Hours of operation 1000Z to 2200Z 29 Jun to 21 Jul inclusive, except during Exercise Check Point, when facilities will be available 24 hours a day.

i - Call Signs: RT Ribbon WT P8Y.

ii - HF Back-up: With Station North Bay on 2594 Kc/s, 4760 Kc/s and 9400 Kc/s.

iii - Beacons: Val d’Or identifier VO, frequency 239 KC/s. Rouyn identifier UY, frequency 218 KC/s. Note: Beacons will operate continuously from 1 Jul to 18 Jul inclusive.

iv - UHF and VHF Frequency Plan and Call Signs: In accordance with TSI’s except as amended by ADC letter S601-7 (Comm 1) dated 15 Jun 54.

v - Nav Aids: In accordance with Radio Facility Charts.

Signed by:
(WS Quint) S/L
Sector Commander
No 2 Sector ADC

Annexes -

1. Sector Operational Organization
2. Special Intelligence Instructions
3. Special Operational Instructions

ANNEX 2
To 2 ADCC
Ops Order 2/54

1. MAPS: World Aeronautical Charts (1:1,000,000) to cover specified areas in which the exercise will be conducted.

2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:

1. The first positive indication that an attack by FAKER is under way. (First visual observation of a FAKER aircraft).
2. The number, by type, of FAKER aircraft penetrating the defended areas.
3. The number, by type, of FAKER aircraft intercepted.
4. The number of FAKER aircraft, by type, crippled or destroyed.
5. The escape routes and/or crash sites of FAKER aircraft.
6. Information obtained from captured FAKER personnel, material and documents indicating take-off bases, future attack plans, target systems, tactics to be employed and number of aircraft available for re-attack.
7. Targets attacked by FAKER aircraft, types of weapons employed and points of weapon impact.
8. Action of FAKER’s army, navy and agents.
9. Operational Factors:

1. Tactics.
2. Aircraft operating characteristics.
3. Effect of Weather.
4. Use and effectiveness of electronic countermeasures.
5. Detection of airborne electronic transmissions.
6. Use of evasion action and operational deception.
7. Aircraft armament.
8. Aircraft markings and identification.
9. Aircraft configuration (radomes, wing tanks, etc.)

3. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

1. Distribution of Reports - Reports are to be prepared in duplicate and both copies forwarded to 2 ADCC in accordance with Intelligence SOP’s.
2. Sector Intelligence Officer - The Sector Intelligence Officer will utilize reports received from subordinate units and plot the information forwarded by the ADCC duty controller to provide the Sector Commander and his staff with timely intelligence information upon which to base defensive operations.
3. Intelligence Situation Summary - During the period of the exercise the Command Intelligence Officer will prepare, and transmit by teletype, to subordinate units and to lateral RCAF and USAF Commands, an Intelligence Situation Summary. This summary will be an evaluated intelligence report, narrative in form, covering information obtained on the intelligence requirements listed in paragraph 2. The summary will be issued as the situation warrants, normally every two hours on the even hour, Greenwich Mean Time. The Sector Intelligence Officer will send a sector summary to all subordinate units, if and when warranted.
4. Subversive Activity - In order that maximum value may be obtained from the exercise from an Operational standpoint, no simulated subversive operations will be employed. Unit Intelligence Officers will advise personnel of this fact so that any actual subversive activity, acts of sabotage, or attempts by persons to obtain information concerning the conduct of the exercise will be reported and appropriate action taken.
5. Prefixes - The danger, inherent in exercises, that an enemy may time and attack on this Continent to coincide with FAKER operations, thus causing confusion among the defending forces, makes it imperative that all intelligence personnel maintain a high degree of alertness to incidents and reports which might indicate such an attack. Reports, shall be worded that there will be no possibility of confusing a critical situation with simulated situations of FAKER Operations. In transmitting exercise messages, either by voice or in writing, the first words of the text will identify the report as an exercise message. For example, "This is an Exercise Check Point Intelligence Flash Report". During the exercise, when a message concerning an actual situation is passed, the first words shall be, "This is an Operation Intelligence Message. This is not an exercise message".
6. Captured Enemy Documents, Materials and Prisoners - See Intelligence Standing Operating Procedures. FAKER aircrews defecting to the West or forces to land on ADC airfields will be processed and interrogated in accordance with this directive.
7. Claims - Intelligence personnel shall become thoroughly familiar with the rules established as a yardstick for estimating the number of FAKER aircraft destroyed, probably destroyed and damaged. Following is a summary of exercise claims rules:

1. Day Operations:

1. Destroyed - A FAKER is considered destroyed when it has been subjected to a combined total of four passes to within effective range by a minimum of two fighter aircraft. Effective range is considered to be within 750 yards. This may be done by two passes by each of the aircraft or three passes by one and a single pass by the other. Each interceptor will be presumed to have expended its ammunition after four firing passes. In some instances, it is possible that pilots may be considered insufficiently experienced to make attacks, although they may be flying as Number 2’s. In such cases, the Number 2 shall stand off while the element leader makes the attacks. Two effective attacks by the element leader will then constitute "destruction" of the FAKER, as it will be presumed that the Number 2 would have followed his leader under actual combat conditions. If the Number 2 fails to attack, although he is qualified and authorized to do so, this exception does not apply.
2. Probably Destroyed - A FAKER is considered probably destroyed when it has been subjected to a combined total of three effective attacks. A single interceptor making three attacks may claim a "probable".
3. Damaged - a FAKER is considered damaged when it has been subjected to a combined total of one or two attacks by an interceptor.

2. Night Operations Airborne intercept equipped fighters may operate individually. One completed interception, closing to effective range, as defined for the equipment in use, after lock-on or under manual scanning followed by visual contact, will constitute destruction of the FAKER aircraft. One all-weather fighter has the assumed capability of destroying three FAKER aircraft on each night sortie. Claims for "probables" and "damaged" FAKERS may be submitted by AW aircrew under special circumstances, such as a minor malfunction of equipment or excessive overtaking speed. Claims for "probables" and "damaged" may be changed to "destroyed" claims is a successful re-attack is executed. The de-briefing report will include the basis for such claims.

APPENDIX "A"
to ANNEX 2
2ADCC
Ops Order 2/54
23 Jun 54

General Situation

As a result of FAKER’s announced intention of imposing its totalitarian policies and ideologies, together with complete control by a central dictatorship, upon those countries now comprising the free world, and as a result of continued aggression and the annexation of small, free nations by force and by political and economic domination, a situation of increasing tension has existed between Canada and FAKER since 1945. Recent flagrant violations by FAKER of existing international agreements have brought about a further increase in tension to the point where an outbreak of open hostilities between Canada and FAKER may be reasonably expected at any time. Reports received during the past four weeks indicate that the enemy is completely capable of launching a large scale air attack upon any target or targets within North America, employing atomic bombs as the principal weapon. Further reports from usually reliable sources indicate that long range bomber units with accompanying support aircraft have disappeared from their regular bases in the FAKER homeland, presumably dispatched to auxiliary air bases in the FAKER homeland, presumably dispatched to auxiliary air bases on the northern periphery of the FAKER-dominated areas, from whence they could operate to fullest advantage against Canada and the United States. FAKER propaganda, for both internal and foreign consumption has reached fever pitch, and confirmed reports originating within FAKER’s borders indicate that the entire country is now on an emergency wartime basis. All military reserve units have been recalled and all leaves cancelled. No FAKER aircraft are known to be operating over or about North America. However, several unidentified aircraft observed off the coasts of Canada have been identified as possible FAKER "ferret" flights.

Enemy Air Forces: FAKER air units regarded as capable of attack upon targets within Canada and the United States are equipped with aircraft which were copied, clandestinely and exactly, from current RCAF and USAF models. Performance of these aircraft may be expected to exceed (particularly in combat range) the RCAF and USAF models which they duplicate. Aircraft which may be used include:

FAKER Aviation Strength - The current FAKER Air Strength in long range units is estimated to be about 500. FAKER is credited with an operational capability of 90% of aircraft in active units or 450 aircraft as a maximum for any one operation.

Air Bases - The exact location of FAKER advanced air bases is unknown but it is estimated that approximately 90% of his long range air units have been moved into, and are now in combat readiness at, completely operational air bases north of the 70^th parallel, situated along the northerly periphery of the FAKER area of dominance.

Logistics - No logistical shortages, supply or transportation difficulties which would hinder FAKER in an initial air attack against North America are known to exist.

Aircraft Performance - Performance of FAKER aircraft is estimated to be essentially the same as that of RCAF and USAF counterparts. Combat ranges have been increased, however, and that factor, together with FAKER’s capability of in-flight refueling, enables him to attack any target within Canada or the United States and return to base.

Armament - It is estimated that the armament characteristics of FAKER aircraft are the same as those of the latest RCAF and USAF types.

Radio - FAKER may be expected to have the same communication and navigation aids as employed by RCAF and USAF aircraft.

Radar Navigation and Bombing Equipment - FAKER airborne radar is estimated to be a native version of APQ 13 or APS 15, and FAKER is estimated to have a version of the Norden M-9 bombing equipment to supplement this radar.

Electronic Countermeasures - FAKER ECM capabilities have progressed to the point where they constitute a major threat. Chaff, electronic jammers and/or deception devices covering all communications and radar facilities are within FAKER capabilities.

Maintenance - Approaches RCAF and USAF standards.

Fighting Effectiveness - FAKER Air Force, with its penchant for copying RCAF and USAF equipment, may be expected to copy RCAF and USAF tactical methods. FAKER has been reported to be training in single aircraft penetration of target areas at very low and at very high altitudes (up to 50,000 feet) as well as in saturation type penetrations of target areas, using formations of from 20 to 40 aircraft. FAKER has a capability of air refueling and has been observed refueling outside of radar cover just prior to making practice penetrations of their own radar cover. Attacking aircraft can be expected to make maximum use of ECM, RCAF and USAF markings, and English speaking pilots for reporting to ADIZ’s, CADIZ,s and/or airways.

Guided Missiles - FAKER does not have the capability to launch missiles.

BW, CW and Nuclear Capabilities in Air Attack.

Biological Warfare: - No intelligence is available on FAKER efforts to produce and stockpile BW agents.

Chemical Warfare: - Production and stockpiling of nerve gases is estimated to be sufficient for sustained attacks against North America.

Nuclear Warfare: - FAKER Air Force has sufficient nuclear weapons for all key targets.

Enemy Ground Forces - The air drop or air landing of small airborne task forces for the accomplishment of specific tasks is within FAKER capabilities, and suck attacks may be undertaken near the outbreak of hostilities or in conjunction with air attacks upon North America.

Enemy Naval Forces - Except for covert reconnaissance of coastal areas by FAKER submarines and the possible use of those submarines to furnish certain communications facilities, including navigational aids to FAKER aircraft, there is no capability on the part of FAKER to launch a sea-borne attack upon North America.

Psychological Warfare - FAKER possesses very definite capabilities to wage psychological warfare, and has given every indication of ingenuity in its application.

Subversion and Sabotage - FAKER sympathizers in Canada and the United States constitute a potent weapon for subversion and sabotage. This capability undoubtedly could be exploited in conjunction with a general air attack.

Weather - Current en route weather from presumed FAKER air bases is generally favorable at this time. See current local, short and long range forecasts.

It is estimated that FAKER will concentrate his attacks on our major industrial and population centres, with some attention being given to ADC airfields. In conducting an air attack, the following courses of action would be open to FAKER.

Attack, with an estimated maximum force of 450 aircraft, any target within Canada or the United States and return to base.

Conduct a series of aerial attacks over a relatively long period of time, estimated at one to two weeks, utilizing single aircraft or small formations of aircraft upon any target or a number of targets within North America.

Attacking aircraft would carry conventional, nuclear, BW and/or CW weapons and the enemy could make maximum use of electronic countermeasures by:

The FAKER submarine force, as navigational aids and for ECM activity.

All types of sabotage and subversion by FAKER sympathizers in Canada and the United States.

Airborne troops used against vital isolated points in Canada.

4. In view of the current situation which exists between the West and FAKER, and especially considering the events of the past ten days, it is believed that FAKER may launch, at any time, an aerial attack, or series of aerial attacks, upon key targets within North America. It is believed that FAKER will not await the formality of an open declaration of war but will use every method possible to achieve surprise, and that his long range aircraft will attack in sufficient force to achieve, in FAKER’s estimation, a decisive blow to Canadian and United States war potential and the will to wage war.

GENERAL