From Sea to Shining Sea

Nunavut translates as "our land" and the new territory represents one-fifth of Canada's landmass. It contains much of the DEW Line's integrated chain of 42 radar and communication stations stretching 3,000 miles from the northwest coast of Alaska to Nunavut's eastern shore about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. The Resolution Island station is nestled in the Baffin Island Region, a rugged tract of mountains and rocky gorges along an extremely foggy patch of the North Atlantic Ocean.

The cleanup of Resolution Island will take five to six years since work can only be done during the warmer months of July, August and September. Even this work is often interrupted by weeks of fog when flights cannot be made to or from the island.

The project is the passion of people like Scott Mitchell, head of the contaminated sites office at INAC, who plans to remove the contaminants that are leaching into the soil and water, especially those that contain PCBs. These are particularly egregious given that the PCB problem is serious in the Arctic. This class of potentially carcinogenic man-made chemicals -- once used in transformers and other electronic equipment -- doesn't readily break down in the natural environment. Volatized PCB residues evaporating and condensing from lake to lake and forest to forest leap-frog their way via the planet's complex atmospheric circulatory system up to the Arctic where they concentrate and move up the food chain in fish, seals and other creatures. The fatty tissue of polar bears and Inuit men and women (and breast milk) contain higher PCB levels than that of people in the industrial areas to the south.

Resolution Island is a tough assignment. It's a two-hour helicopter ride from the nearest airport and heavy equipment must be sea lifted. The crew works 10 hours per day, seven days a week. Just clearing the snow at the start of the season can take two weeks and dangerous polar bears routinely enter the camp.

But the greatest risks at Resolution Island aren't the ones imposed by Mother Nature. Instead, they're the risks triggered by the removal, packaging and storage of man-made materials like liquid PCBs, hydrocarbon-contaminated soil, asbestos, mercury, cobalt, aluminum and radioactive waste. More than 4,000 barrels are scattered around the site and several hundred contain leaking petroleum products. Many areas are stained from spills.

Site investigations headed by scientist John Polland, Ph.D., of Queen's University between 1994 and 1997 revealed that the island contains approximately 4,000 cubic metres of soil contaminated with PCBs at concentrations above the federal limit of 50 ppm. The most contaminated areas are in the so-called "S1/S4 areas" that include a valley, beach, furniture dump and buildings where PCB levels have been measured as high as 8,000 PPM

These are the sort of hot spots where one would expect to see workers wear special protective gear. "I'd never allow my people to work in an area like that without Level-B suits, respirators and special gloves and boots," says Mitchell Gibbs, an environmental contractor with TEAM-1 Environmental Services Inc. in Hamilton, Ontario. He adds that chemical-protective fabric undergarments are also essential.

The Qikiqtaaluk Corporation (QC) coordinates the cleanup crew that consisted of 62 people at the height of the most recent work season. Michael Brown, P.Eng, is the director of environmental services for QC. He decided to move north from Toronto two years ago.

"Iqaluit [the capital of Nunavut] is like Ontario was in the 1980s," Mr. Brown says. "Business is booming and there's a lot to be done to get proper waste management systems underway."

The Resolution Island cleanup project has a senior management team made up of Jerry Ell (QC), Ricky Hurst (INAC), Ed Collins (Environment Canada) and John Polland (Queen's University). The project -- along with Nunavut's first site remediation effort, Cape Hooper -- has put QC in a favorable position to manage more projects scheduled over the next 15 years and the majority of the DEW-Line sites are located in Nunavut's Baffin Region.

Not an ordinary company, QC was created by the Qikiqtani Inuit Association in 1983. An "Inuit Birthright" corporation, QC trains aboriginal people in the skills needed in the North's modernizing economy. The term "Inuit Birthright" describes a person born in Nunavut or whom has at least one parent born there. To date, QC and its subsidiaries and joint ventures -- including Inuit Environmental Services, Nunavut Petroleum Corporation and Nunavut Construction Corporation -- have trained more than 750 Inuit.

"By the time the Resolution Island cleanup is in its fourth or fifth year, I'd like to employ a staff that is 100 per cent Inuit," says Mr. Ell, president of QC.

This would include everyone working in heavy equipment operations, hazardous materials handling, construction, camp operations and project administration. The only exceptions would be researchers from Queen's University Analytical Service Unit and the two engineers from Legault Desjardins Simon Consultants Inc. (LDS).

There's been a high turnover in the project manager position. There were a total of four project managers in 1998 alone.

Last season, the QC staff was 85 per cent Inuit. Until such time as the workforce is Inuit-only, skilled southerners such as Robert Baker must be imported.

QC's Mr. Ell and Mr. Brown say that there is tension over the phasing out of the employment of non-Inuit people from their current positions.

Gary Vaillancourt (non-Inuit), the project's technical advisor in 1999 and formerly the site superintendent, says that his paycheck was delayed. A confrontation about this matter with Mr. Brown at QC's headquarters in Iqaluit almost came to blows.

"QC may be overwhelmed with the administrative responsibility of this project, but that's no excuse to have to demand to be paid," says Mr. Vaillancourt.

Whatever one thinks of the Inuit Birthright concept, it becomes tricky where the safe handling of toxic materials and wastes is concerned. The question arises: Have health and safety standards been compromised at Resolution Island in order to fast-track the Inuit population into jobs?

QC's project management team -- which in 1998 included Mr. Mitchell, Harry Flaherty, Gary Vaillancourt and Philippe Simon, P.Eng. (of LDS) -- conducted twice-weekly onsite meetings to discuss training and operations.

It was at one of those meetings in 1998 that Robert Baker's contract was terminated.

Mr. Baker is a professional engineer registered in both Ontario and the Northwest Territories with more than 15 years experience in domestic and international civil works projects that include hundreds of hours consulting on the DEW Line site cleanups of Cape Hooper and several offsite hours for Resolution Island.

He alleges he quickly encountered health and safety violations that he believed needlessly increased the risk of injury to workers, potentially exposed them to harmful substances, and created the possibility of an environmental release.

"I felt there were real communication failures," Mr. Baker says. "I witnessed management intimidation, a lack of expertise, and even just a lack of plain common sense, especially in some of the decisions made by [then] site superintendent Gary Vaillancourt." In one incident, according to Mr. Baker, Mr. Valliancourt set out unprotected to survey a highly contaminated uninvestigated area. Mr. Vaillancourt wanted to perform his own survey of the area plans before the construction of a road were finalized. (When asked about the incident, Vaillancourt disagreed that he was at risk and Dr. Polland of Queen's University says that contaminants in the area had been characterized.)

Concerned about what he describes as a "cowboy mentality," Mr. Baker voiced his concerns in hopes that he could raise the level of professionalism at the site. Instead, he found himself on the chopper headed for home.

"I was asked to resign from the project," says Mr. Baker. "When I refused, my contract was immediately terminated."

From his Montreal-based office, Mr. Baker sent letters to INAC, QC and Queen's University.

The letters listed some of the health and safety violations he says he witnessed on Resolution Island in his short time there. Mr. Baker claimed and the report discusses that loader lifting exceeded rated capacities, as did loader hauling.

Air-brake equipped vehicles were driven by unlicensed operators and welding operations were extremely dangerous (including welding on a fuel tank and beside a waste incinerator).

The management team offers a couple of opinions on the problems raised by Mr. Baker that relate to his job performance. Mr. Ell characterizes Mr. Baker as someone who just didn't fit in with the group on the island. "Baker's militaristic management style didn't mesh with the other workers," he says.

Mr. Mitchell says, "Mr. Baker was a paranoid person who was difficult to work with." But Mr. Hurst, Mr. Mitchell's supervisor at INAC, states that "Mr. Baker's concerns were real," and that it was appropriate for Mr. Baker to take any perceived safety violations seriously.

INAC ordered an independent review of the Resolution Island operation and the 15-page report was completed by Phoenix OHC, Inc. of Ottawa, Ontario in June 1999.

The introduction of the Phoenix report states: "Although there were various subjective and emotional aspects to the concerns and how they were raised, this report concludes that there was substance to the complaints and that it was good fortune that a serious accident did not occur in the summer of 1998."

The report describes a couple of incidents that were "left to happenstance" such as the incident involving a dump truck that stalled while an operator was driving it uphill. The "parking brake had been insufficient to hold the truck in place on the steep slope." Another incident involved an operator who had to "jump from the vehicle, which then continued to descend down the hill, and ended up resting on a guy wire supporting a building." The incident report describing the event was not made available to Mr. Baker, who says that he had asked for it at the time. The Phoenix report also says that the "incident report describing this event was not made available."

Most health and safety officers would consider such incidents potentially serious even at a regular construction or demolition workplace. The fact that they occurred in the context of a remote toxic waste cleanup is disturbing.

The Phoenix report went on to state that "on-site communication procedures are not sufficiently systematic, effective, or understood." The report suggested that improvements were needed to administrative systems such as clear reporting lines and procedures. The consultants wrote that specific concerns raised by workers or managers must be addressed according to the appropriate statutes, regulations, guidelines and industry standards. They called for mandatory proper maintenance of vehicles and improvements to the general adequacy of equipment. They recommended that trainers be fully versed in all regulations and requirements and stated that these must be available to the trainees before they are permitted to work onsite. They noted that trainees must not be allowed to make critical decisions or to be put in danger and that an integral health and safety plan had to be put in place by the start of the 1999 operational season. The fact that the consultants found they had to recommend such basic operational standards and practices speaks volumes about the legitimacy of Mr. Baker's allegations in 1998. (The full Phoenix report is posted at www.hazmatmag.com.)

Mr. Baker wasn't satisfied.

On June 15, 1999, he provided then-Minister of INAC Jane Stewart a comprehensive review of the Phoenix report and alleged that the consultants weren't provided all the relevant information.

In his review, Mr. Baker points out that the report's recommendations assume that onsite management staff have adequate experience, licenses and qualifications to manage safety and heavy-equipment training operations. For example, Robert Eaton (known as "Safety Bob") has been health and safety officer for the past two years but is not a Canadian Registered Safety Professional (CRSP).

Mr. Baker also questioned the arms-length relationship of the government to the project and pointed out that INAC, contrary to the wording in the Phoenix report, actively participates in the selection of certain key positions.

On September 28, Robert Nault, the new minister of INAC, wrote Mr. Baker a letter in which he acknowledged his comments and informed him that he was satisfied that the senior management and project management teams had reviewed the Phoenix report.

"While they also have some concerns about the accuracy of the contents of the report," he wrote, "the managers decided to err on the side of caution and implement immediately all of the recommendations. They remain confident that measures are in place for this field season that will address all of the concerns.

"The Management Team has demonstrated its commitment to the safety of the workers at the site by, for example, instituting a new Health and Safety Plan and hiring a full-time medical technician, and a health and safety officer on the site."

However, Mr. Nault did not address Mr. Baker's claims that certain staff members are unqualified.

"Existing training qualifications as well as health and safety policies need to be updated," says Mr. Baker. "INAC should take responsibility to ensure that the management team has the experience necessary to implement and monitor the Resolution Island project."

Scott Mitchell disputes the allegations about the qualifications of his staff.

"Robert Eaton has been a First Aid Instructor for the military," he says, "and has been involved in health and safety for years." Mr. Eaton's training goes back to 1962 when he participated in the National Survivor Program. Mr. Eaton's past experience in health and safety includes work as a trainer at other remote northern camps.

Mr. Mitchell says he is also satisfied with Mr. Vaillancourt's abilities. "Gary is a licensed helicopter pilot who has worked in construction and technical operations at other contaminated sites, including ones in Iqaluit," Mr. Mitchell says. "His skills are needed for next year, specifically to instruct others to operate the waste oil incinerators."

Mr. Mitchell agrees that Mr. Vaillancourt is a longtime personal friend of his. Also, "Black-eyed" Joe Ekjuak, who holds a position in heavy equipment operations, was formerly married to Mr. Mitchell's current wife.

There is evidence that parts of the safety plan recommended by the authors of the Phoenix report have neither been followed nor monitored. One staff member who requested not to be named points out that the mandatory drug and alcohol testing for the management team was bypassed.

Questioned about this, Mr. Eaton says that the management team decided to forgo that component of the plan because substance abuse was not a concern the team had identified. The Resolution Island "Rule Book" states that it is, in effect, a dry camp although it's difficult to determine what controls exist over mood altering substances other than alcohol.

No injuries were sustained onsite in 1999 but accident reports were filed. A report dated July 18 describes one incident in which a loaded CAT Rock-Truck D250E spun out of control in the absence of the heavy equipment operator supervisor, Dave Lorenzen. Mr. Eaton notes that the "accident was due to driver error and inexperience."

Site Superintendent Harry Flaherty says that two heavy-equipment operator supervisors will be employed on camp for the full 2000 work season because "one wasn't enough last year." He adds that, "We're trying our best to troubleshoot." Mr. Flaherty hopes to return next year. He's a heavy equipment and auto mechanic who has attained a senior management diploma and whose background includes project management for NWT Public Works for over 15 years. It doesn't hurt that he's also something of a blue blood by Inuit standards, being a descendent of Robert Flaherty, the famous Scottish author of Nanuk of the North, who married an Inuit woman.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Brown advise that further investigation as well as regular monitoring is necessary at Resolution Island, citing the Phoenix report that states, "It is unclear to what extent the HASP [Health and Safety Plan] has subsequently been modified, or adhered to, by site personnel."

Yet the crew at the project remain confident about the quality of their work and their skills.

"As far as health and safety is concerned," Mr. Eaton says, "Resolution Island is the Cadillac of the DEW-Line sites."

By Connie Vitello