OUR FILE: S.59
REF. YOUR S.316-1-5/30 (APM)
DATED 30-September-43.
ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE
November 18, 1943
Air Officer Commanding in Chief,
Eastern Air Command Hdqs,
Halifax, NS, Canada.
1. With reference to para 4 of letter dated 30th September, the letter file S.59 dated 7th March which is therein quoted has apparently been misunderstood.
2. At any rate at the time of taking over this Detachment the defence position was: - one us 18 Pounder (replaced now) and no strategically placed and manned posts, but rther four rallying points to which certain personnel were directed in the event of alarm for defence purposes.
3. These four points were:
4. Analysis shows (1) to be about 800 yards away, (2) well over a mile and a very difficult place to get to, (3) about 800 yards away, (4) adjacent to the camp but some 600 yards from domestic site.
5. This was deemed to be impracticable and to disperse the personnel to such an extent that they would be unable to support each other - remembering this was the disposal to be made immediately upon the sounding of an alarm and no two points would be in view of each other.
6. Accordingly a revision has been made on the assumption that a landing is practicable not at merely four points but at any point on Quirpon Island. This is so as the writer himself has landed on apparently inaccessible cliffs and climbed to the top without difficulty at various parts of the shore in the vicinity of the camp.
7. A sketch has been made and is attached showing some of the salient features of the ground to be covered as well as the contour.
8. The domestic site is at the North West end of the Island with a cliff dropping to the sea on the west and protecting it from view. The cliff top itself being variously 150 ft from sea level to 220 ft and about 40 ft above the camp site itself. To the East is marsh again bordered by a hill somewhat higher than the western cliff. This latter hill completely cuts off any view of Pigeon cove and Degrat Harbour.
9. It was therefore deemed expedient to offer strong protection for the RDF, Diesel and W/T buildings, and protection for the domestic site.
10. To do this two sandbagged machine gun posts have been erected, one at the RDF and the other two between the Diesel Hut and domestic site (No 3 & 7 on sketch). In addition a M/G mounting has been placed at two other points 5 & 9. These mountings are movable and placed at the most obviously strategic position but not with sandbags as they would most probably be moved to give added fire range in the direction from which attack is made. Post 5 can support and be supported by posts 3 & 7 while post 9 is rather on a limb but can receive support from post 7.
11. Fighting around the domestic site itself is not to be encouraged owing to the grave danger of inflicting casualties on Detachment personnel, but rather by having a good field of fire with greater range to prevent any approach to the Detachment.
12. As well be observed a low, boggy stretch of ground runs roughly from Grande Cove (10) to Cod Cove (16) and this is commanded from the various posts set up. While the hill from Colombia Point (11) running back inland towards the top of Pigeon Cove is very steep towards the detachment side and would almost make it imperative to attack at the comparative gap between The Noddick (13) and Colombia Point. This would be in direct open view from points 3, 5, and 7 and 9. The shorter approach from Grande Cove could be covered by points 3, 5 and 7 while any attempted flanking movement might be observed and prevent by fire from point 9. Attack from Cod Cove could be temporarily halted by point 9 and support sent across towards the Noddick to give a cross fire.
13. All this of course is contingent upon visibility. If an attack were made under cover of darkness the only probably effective course would be to rally to the various points indicated and keep very quiet, tackling whatever party approached.
14. As approach to the vital areas would have to be made past and close to some of these points and by remaining quiet we would not be inflicting causalties on detachment personnel. In this event the domestic site would probably suffer but the more important areas would be protected.
15. With regards to paragraph 5 of letter dated 30th of September a warning signal (siren) is being supplied but has not been delivered as yet, and at present we are reduced to: (1) telephone communications from Grande Cove and the various buildings (2) the noise of sten gun fire (3) banging on empty 18 pounder cases (4) Discharge of Very Light, red. There is no one point that can command all approaches to the Island.
16. The more immediate approaches to the Detachment can be kept under surveillance by using two positions - one along the ridge from points 2 - 9 and the other along the ridge from points 9 - 13. This would be in the nature of patrols and would cover in each instance distances of over 1/2 a mile. This with the present complement of 5 security guards is of course out of the question, and as a result one patrol is ordered between points 10 and 9 and extending down towards point 16. Considerable assistance has been received in the past from the Lighthousekeeper who is rather well placed and maintains a good watch at sea. He has telephoned information to the detachment of the approach of vessels and has assisted in the identification of ships observed by detachment personnel.
17. Normally no vessel is in view from any of the detachment buildings, when it is not roughly NE of the detachment or in a very restricted S.W. direction, while at the RDF the area observable is from NE to E while small craft can come so close inshore to the cliff that it means climbing down the cliff some distance before they are visible.
18. Considerable reliance is placed in the numerous dogs around the detachment belonging to the lighthousekeeper, to give warning of the approach of persons other than airmen to whom they normally give no attention.
19. There are a few signboards, but no wire or posts to mark the detachment area.
20. The placing of a telephone at Pigeon Cove and another at Quirpon Harbour is being considered, but will depend on the wire at our disposal, this should serve to help give early warning of an impending attack.
(Sgd)(DJ Heath) Flying Officer,
Officer Commanding,
No 30 Detachment, RCAF,
Cape Bauld, Nfld
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Updated: April 8, 2003